Karinsky Mikhail Ivanovich

Born November 4, 1840, Mr.. He graduated from the course at the Moscow Theological Academy: taught philosophy at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, in 1880, for his thesis "Classification of findings", received his Ph.D. from the University of St. Petersburg. Other works Karinskoe: "A Critical Review of the last period of Germanic philosophy" (Saint-Petersburg, . 1873), "On the question of positivism" ( "Legal Observer", . 1875); Apollo Tyana "(ibid., . 1877); "phenomenon and the reality" ( "Legal Observer", . 1787), "On the relationship between philosophical views with the physical and astronomy in ancient period of Greek philosophy" ( "Christian Reading", . 1883); "Infinite" Anaximander "(St. Petersburg, . 1890), "On the self-evident truths" (ib., . 1893, . Issue 1), "differences in the schools of the new empiricism on the issue of self-evident truths" ( "Journal of the Ministry of National Education", . 1902 and following),
. In all his writings Karinsky showed the depth of analysis and greater honesty in criticism of others' thoughts. These properties Karinsky showed in his fruitful teaching. Of his disciples was isolated in. Of silver, the author of essays on Locke. Most of the historical works Karinskoe has the character of monographs, . on the most complex issues, only "Overview of German philosophy" is a brilliant sketch of the basic ideas of German philosophy, . beginning with Kant and ending Hartmann,
. This analysis of the classics of German philosophy and their epigones contains and guiding ideas of the Karinskoe. All German philosophy is whichever direction, which gave her a Kant. But Kant's system, as shown Karinsky, has fundamental shortcomings, and therefore all attempts to systematize, grown on this soil, untenable. We must, therefore, to revisit the basic questions of knowledge. Thus, the history of philosophy has Karinskoe to the issues that make up the dogmatic part of his research. Theory of knowledge - is the main task of philosophy. In the true knowledge we have, firstly, the formula output, and secondly - since every proof rests on the self-evident truths - to determine the number of axioms and an indication of the reliability of their rights. These two tasks Karinsky permits in two essays: the first - in the "Classification of conclusions", the second - in truth self-evident ". "Classification of findings" - the only Russian is quite original and very significant work on logic. Karinsky shows failure of the two opposite directions in the logic - syllogistic, formal (Aristotelian) and inductive (Bacon and Mill). He argues that one should not base conclusions on the classification of the distinction between induction and syllogism. Among the syllogistic conclusions there are those who would be closer to induction than other syllogistic, the very principle divisions syllogistic figures as a purely external, akin divides and unites very different. The opposing school of Bacon and Mill pointed to some significant shortcomings syllogism, but she does not hold water. Denial syllogism Bacon rests on a misunderstanding, his theory of induction gets along well with the syllogism. Adoption of the Mill, that every syllogism is a petitio principii, and we conclude from the private to private - not true, because the conclusion is obtained only if the incremental assumption to make about the similarities between individual cases are. Both areas also have common disadvantages: they ignore a number of legal conclusions, unexplained from their point of view. So you need to find a new principle for the classification of the findings. Conclusion is transferring one of the main elements already established in our knowledge of the judgments on the corresponding place in a different judgments on the basis of a relationship between the remaining elements of the two judgments. Logically, judgment transfer of elements from one to another can be justified in cases of identity of these elements. Thus, the identity is a justification of any withdrawal. This idea Karinskoe brings him to the direction of mathematical logic (Hamilton and others). Since the main elements in judging two, . subject and predicate, . some of them are obtained by comparing the two main groups of findings: first, . Comparing the subjects based on two propositions, . gives positive findings, the second, . based on the predicate Comparing the two judgments, . gives conclusions and hypothetical negative,
. Karinsky gives a very detailed description of the first group, with stops at the perfectly legal conclusions, are usually not placed in the writings on logic, for example, the conclusion of the parts of the unit to the unit. Very interesting indication of how the so-called incomplete induction should be reduced to a common logical grounds for withdrawal - the identity of. The second group considered Karinsky less detail. In general we can say that Karinsky found the correct principle and brilliantly led him, can only argue about the details, for example, about the place, which should be given inference by analogy. The second task of logic, which has a much greater philosophical significance, is to list and justification of self-evident truths. On the nature of them, there are two diametrically opposed views: rationalist and empirical. This strongly supports the opposite direction, represented by Kant and Mill. Karinsky, in the first edition of his work: "On the self-evident truths," only considers the rationalistic solution to the issue, and, in a sense otozhestvlyaya rationalism with kantianizmom, elaborates the Critique of Pure Reason ". Until that time was not in the literature as a comprehensive analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason, bold and deep. Karinsky first criticizes the original position of the Critique of Pure Reason "and proves his dogmatism: assuming inexperienced origin of the axioms of knowledge, . Kant refers to the universality and the need for them - but the universality and necessity must be proven, . not assume,
. More Karinsky stops at the axioms of mathematics and argues that the contemplation of space and time can be a priori, and judgments about the laws of contemplation (eg, mathematical axioms) can occur from the experience. Mathematical knowledge could only be speculative, . if it were analytical, . rather than synthetic, . as taught by Kant, but in this case it would not be universal and necessary, . since one can imagine the space and with different properties, . than, . that people recognize him,
. Finally, . Karinsky pointed out the contradiction between the transcendental aesthetics "Critique of Pure Reason" and her analyst: the first mathematical axioms are derived from the contemplation, . second, they are considered as results of rational activity, . so that the analyst makes unnecessary the doctrine of the contemplation,
. In the third part Karinsky examines the doctrine of the mind, t. e. transcendental analytic. Kant repeatedly criticized the fact that it does not display the categories of reason, as intended, but takes them ready. Karinsky, . pointing out some shortcomings of the theory of categories, . shows, . that bound to the categories of thought can not be ascertained, and the idea is quite dogmatic assertion, . why the precepts are the nature of blind necessity,
. More Karinsky considering all categories of relationships, and of them - the reason. To recognize the objective change, it is necessary to discern the cause of her dependence on the preceding events, but it can not discern, not recognizing the change of objective, and t. d. infinity. Consequently, there is no possibility of objective changes; Kant nonetheless argues that our perceptions, we are dealing with external reality. Finally, the fourth part the author considers the theory of building a world pure self-consciousness. Karinsky agrees with Kant's views on identity as a force, . without the unity and identity which can not be knowledge, . and criticizes a provision, . that consciousness creates the outer world of consciousness caused by the same feelings, . guided by the laws of intuition and the categories of reason,
. - Wed. E. Radl ( "Russian Review", 1890, September); his "Karinsky" (1895). E. Radlov.