Bahmetev Boris( The diplomat, politician, thinker)
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Biography Bahmetev Boris
June 20, 1917 engineer and scientist Boris Bahmetev arrived at the head of Russia's emergency mission to the United States, he was also charged with managing Russia's embassy in Washington and assigned to the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. July 5, 1917, Mr.. Bahmetev presented his credentials to President Woodrow Wilson, the Ambassador from becoming de facto ambassador to the de jure. November 8, 1918, . when the U.S. was received of the Bolshevik coup, . Bahmetev was in Memphis, . where he was to deliver another speech, . aimed at promoting Russia's efforts in the war and the creation of a new image, . democratic Russia in the eyes of Americans,
. Bahmetev reacted immediately to the coup, saying that the new Petrograd authorities do not reflect the spirit and sentiment of the people.
. The U.S. government, after a two-week pause, confirmed Bakhmetev diplomatic status, recognizing it as a true representative of Russia and refusing to have anything to do with the Bolsheviks
. This was the case hitherto unprecedented - the ambassador has not represented the existing government. Five years Bahmetev was in this post, . played a major role in the organization of diplomatic and financial support for the anti-Bolshevik movement, . as well as providing a significant influence in shaping American policy toward Russia, June 30, 1922 he resigned, . applying for it in the form of a letter addressed to U.S. Secretary of State Charles Hughes,
. His government, even in exile, he still was not.
Biography Bakhmetev, oddly enough for such a prominent figure, did not become the object of special study of historians. Perhaps this is due to its border situation: he spent half his life in Russia, half his life - in America. For Soviet historians Bahmetev a long time was the figure of non-grata, and his personal archive at Columbia University, was completely inaccessible to them, and Soviet and American historians, former ambassador was interested in primarily as a diplomat. About Bakhmetev wrote in studies of U.S. foreign policy, especially Russia-US relations (2). As for the other periods of his life, something about them can be found in the superficial and often erroneous information in reference publications, and obituaries published shortly after his death (3).
. Bahmetev was a secretive man and not published during his lifetime no memories
. Although perhaps such intention in his declining years he had, he dictated his memoirs in the oral history project at Columbia University. In print, the text of more than 600 typewritten pages. Oral recollections Bakhmetev are probably the main
. source for his biographer, though they much preferred memoirist deleted.
. Perhaps the reticence Bakhmetev evolved a lot earlier than he entered the diplomatic career and what were some reasons
. In a curriculum vitae, . located among the papers Bakhmetev at Columbia University, . was listed, . that he was born in Tiflis, 1 May 1880 (4) However, in the personal file of an extraordinary professor in the Department of Applied Mechanics, Polytechnic Institute BA Bakhmetev indicated, . that he was born on July 20 that year, . what made an entry in the register Tiflis Sololakskoy Ascension Church in 1880, . that his parents are unknown and he passed on the education of an engineer-technologist Alexander Pavlovich Bakhmeteff, . a godfather were AP Bakhmetiev daughter and a state councilor A,
. Chatelain girl Olga. November 25, 1892, Mr.. A.P. Bakhmetiev fathered by Boris, . what took the decision of the Tiflis district court. (5) We do not know any details about the origin of Bakhmetev, but not whether the adoptive father of a future real ambassador? By the way, . of the discrepancies in the spelling of the name of our hero, it is unclear, . when he lost the soft sign when writing his name in any case, . documents and letters after 1917, he signed as Bahmetev,
In 1898, Mr.. Bahmetev finished with a gold medal 1 st Tiflis Gymnasium (except gymnasium course he was engaged in home languages - French, English and German, as well as music - A.P. Bakhmetyev, big businessman and a very wealthy man, did not spare funds for education her son) and in the same year he entered the Institute of Communications
in St. Petersburg.
Very quickly Bahmetev entered into politics. We left our hometowns politically naive - he remembered more than half a century later. - However, in the atmosphere of the university, imbued with political aspirations and thoughts, quickly became revolutionaries in spirit, and sometimes - and for. The humanistic element was very strong and I can not imagine that at that time, someone aged 20 or 23 years was a kind of socialist (6). Bahmetev also among these young people. But that's a socialist, he was not a kind, and thus present - member of the RSDLP, and quite noticeable.
. In 1898, when Bahmetev went to college, started to activate the student movement, which in 1899 a massive and public nature
. According Bakhmetev, the liberation movement, culminating in 1905, actually began in 1899-m. Incidentally, in this thesis - the completion of the liberation movement in the 1905 year, ie. with the publication of the Manifesto of October 17, declared the convening of the Duma's legislative and civil liberties may be felt not only personal experience and the latest thinking, but also the influence of his friend and long-time correspondent VA. Maklakova.
However, the young provincial, which was Bahmetev at the time was not so discreet and quickly worked his way from political innocence to participate in a student's committee as a representative of your school. Remembering the mood among students Bahmetev said that everyone wanted freedom, constitution, free from the power of the autocracy, the responsible government. In fact, at the time, people even called themselves socialists - some of them Marxists (I belonged to a Marxist direction. I do not know why - added Bahmetev) were far removed from today's socialist programs. In other words, they talked about socialism completely abstract. Any socialist in those days would say that first we must win political freedom and then give people the opportunity to decide for himself. (7)
. As a matter of self-Bahmetev read all three volumes of Capital, Karl Marx, the works of David Ricardo, Adam Smith, many books on history, it is self-constituted the basis on which he relied on his own admission, half a century later.
. Remembering his student days, the former Social Democrat, said that the Marxist views, which he then followed, very different from the later interpretation of Marx's Communist
. My ideas more or less coincide with those of the temperate European Social Democracy. First of all, they were absolutely democratic. I believed that any social reform and change should be enforced in a democratic way. The most important thing was political freedom, and it was the conviction of the Social-Democracy around the world. It was about the same as now - outside of communism. I do not believe in the social-democratic ideas now, but in those days, when I was young - believe. But this is the same. In other words, . I believe now, . that the humanitarian objectives and the liberal goals can be achieved better by other means, . but in those days, the most important thing was political freedom, . Constitutional Government, . suffrage, . which was to give a voice to all, and then people could express their will for such social change, . that were needed (8).,
. After graduation Bahmetev was sent abroad for two years to prepare for teaching in the grounded S.YU
. Witte Polytechnic. He spent a year in Switzerland, Zurich Polytechnic where he studied hydraulics, and then a year in the U.S. - studied the methods of engineering work in the U.S.. There he worked on building the Erie Canal, as well as practiced in engineering (9).
Bahmetev and abroad did not abandon political activities and combined the study of engineering with the propaganda of socialist ideas. In meeting B.I. Nicholas is Bakhmetev manuscript, dated 1904 year, with a synopsis of training workers for agrarian program RSDLP. The classes expected to consider such topics, . a brief outline of the development of agriculture in capitalist society, . Capitalism in the Russian countryside, . Social Democratic agrarian policy in capitalist and pre-capitalist society, . Our program and the program of the SR (10),
. Among the papers of former Secretary Bakhmetev, MM. Karpovich, kept dozens of leaflets covered with hand Bakhmetev - a recording of his speeches and essays, relating mainly to 1905. Among them - Development of Russian social democracy, class struggle - the dictatorship of the proletariat - soc [ialisticheskaya] revolution, speech at the meeting in New York on 12 March 1905. the revolutionary events in different times and in different countries, worked by the month of March, for example, in Germany in 1848, speech about the Russian proletariat, and others (11). Obviously, the amateur engineer, led the Social-democratic propaganda in the United States among Russian emigres. It is also curious that Bahmetev kept these records, indicating the sins of his youth, many years. Karpovich became his secretary and left with his ambassador to the United States in 1917, therefore, to get to him before writing could not.
. Bahmetev no mention of his active advocacy in the memoir, meanwhile, figure among the Social Democrats, he was quite prominent
. How else to explain his election to Congress RSDLP IV, . Held in 1906, . of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks? Seems, . Bahmetev not sought to promote its social-democratic past, in any case never mentioned it either in print, . or in private correspondence,
However, soon after reaching the peak of his revolutionary activities, the election of the Central Committee of the leading revolutionary party in Russia, Bahmetev gradually moving away from the policy of this kind. He apparently was truly passionate about their profession, perhaps played a role and the changes in his personal life - 15 (29) July 1905. wedding took place Bakhmetev and Elena Mikhailovna Strinskoy (other sources - Speranskaya), noblewoman, listener St. Petersburg Women's Medical Institute.
Since September 1, 1905. Bahmetev started to work as a senior research assistant at the department of hydraulics of the Polytechnic Institute, he soon began to teach French language at the electromechanical and shipbuilding units. From 1905 to 1911 Bahmetev was a visiting professor of the Institute, in 1911. He defended his doctoral thesis at the Institute of Railway Engineers, and 30 November the same year became a full-time teachers of the Polytechnic Institute. May 26, 1912, Mr.. he was awarded the title of associate in the department of Applied Mechanics, 28 January, 1913. the highest order, he was appointed extraordinary professor of the same department. Bahmetev lectured hydraulics, hydro-energy, pure and applied mechanics. In 1912, Mr.. were published his lectures on hydraulics, in 1914 - Variable fluids in open channels.
. However Bahmetev was not only a theoretician and teacher, he organized a private office, which was engaged in the development of technical projects as commissioned by the Government and private companies
. Bahmetev attracted to the work of not only Russian but also French and Swiss engineers. Projects worked on bahmetevskaya office, were sufficiently ambitious. He was fascinated by the practical activities, which was to transform Russia. According Bakhmetev, the era of the third Duma (1907-1912) was a time of rapid development of the country - this concerns public education, economic and technological progress. In an interview with Wendell Linke, recording his memories, Bahmetev said the apparent feeling of regret that most of the technical achievements of the communists - hydropower, railways, etc.. - Rooted in the era of the 3rd Duma.
Annoyance Bakhmetev due to the fact that he was at the forefront of many projects already completed under Soviet rule and pledged it his greatest accomplishment. And in many respects not completed as conceived Bakhmetev. So, he was chief engineer of a large company, plans to build a hydroelectric dam on the Dnieper. This first large project Bakhmetev been implemented by the Communists - the name of this hydropower is known to all - Dneproges. However, when designing Dnieprostroi Bahmetev not go so far as the Communists - he could not relocate the village, flooding the cemetery, etc.. Comparing his and the Bolshevik projects from an economic point of view, Bahmetev said that his project was worth about 17 million rubles, and the Bolshevik, in comparable prices - 150 million. This is the result of inefficient planning and work, he believed. Another aspect of the problem - the use elektrorenergii. If Bahmetev and his team were concerned about the sale of electricity and hampered by the lack of sufficient market capacity, the Bolsheviks are not very worried about these problems. As a result, according to Bakhmetev, energy, far too expensive for the electrochemical and Electro industry.
. In Dnieprostroi, he was chief engineer in the design of the Volkhov and another gidroelektostantsii in Finland, which should have been, along with the Dnieper, to supply electricity to the Petrograd province
. Design and construction of these hydroelectric subsequently implemented to a large extent the students and assistants Bakhmetev. He also took part in the development of the project on irrigation and irrigation in Central Asia, in particular, the Hungry Steppe (12).
This stormy creative activities interrupted by the war. Bahmetev began working for the Red Cross, he was assistant manager of a surgical hospital, which had been converted into dormitories Polytechnic Institute, then in four or five months has been its director. In early 1915. Bahmetev also began to work for the Special Meeting on Defense. He was given various responsible assignments. Thus, it was aimed at some time in Arkhangelsk, to be the only Russian port is not blocked, in order to help build there business. His companion on this trip was MI Tereshchenko, future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government.
In September 1915. Bahmetev, . on the proposal of the Chairman of the Central Military-Industrial Committee Guchkov and chairman of the State Duma MV Rodzianko, . which was a part of Career Counseling Center, . was sent to the U.S., . understand, . why there are delays in deliveries of ordered materials and rectify the situation,
. Guchkov Rodzianko knew that Bahmetev English proficiency, and also visited the U.S. earlier. Bahmetev called them by their great friends, despite the 20-year difference in age. The decision was taken in September and October Bahmetev went across the ocean (13).
April 16, 1916, Mr.. Special Council requests that the Minister of Trade and Industry about the necessity of leaving Bakhmetev in America in connection with the departure of chairman of the Russian Committee of the blanking Major-General A. Sapozhnikov in London (14). September 14, 1916, Mr.. Chairman of the Career Counseling Center Guchkov appealed to the Minister of Trade and Industry to extend the trip Bakhmetev, . because it, . being in fact one of the most prominent organizers and leaders of the American Committee for blanking, . is not only indispensable person for the Central Committee, . but his work is invaluable for blanking of the Committee,
. Remember such an experienced and energetic leader, . managed to place so highly and brilliantly done the thing he, . can not but cause great and irreparable damage to the activities of the American Committee and, . certainly, . will respond to the success of his work on defense (15).,
. Bahmetev returned from the United States in November 1916
. in connection with the death of his father.
. If I am accompanied by some success and I have had some influence, . when he came here as an ambassador, . - Later summed up his year-long work in the United States in 1915-1916 Bahmetev, . - It is in znachitelnoy extent due to, . that during the war, I became connected and, . perhaps, . established a relationship of mutual trust with many people - perhaps, . not so much on the political, . much of the economic and production line - but, . like whatever, . it was sufficient capital, . who helped me during my tenure as Ambassador in Washington (16).,
. On his return from America Bahmetev went to Tbilisi, to settle the case with real estate, owned by his father
. But here he could not deal with personal affairs. At this time, the Caucasus came Guchkov commander of the Caucasus Front, and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich has asked him to do something like a physical inspection of the armies of the Caucasus Front. Guchkov attracted to this inspection Bakhmetev. It was in December 1916 (17). Less than three months, as the whole life of the country - and Bakhmetev - rapid changes. In February 1917 a revolution occurred.
What was at that time the political beliefs of the former member of RSDLP? Bahmetev severed all relations with the Social Democrats have six or seven years before the revolution. By the fall of the autocracy he had with his former comrades in the party is absolutely no links. Bahmetev not belong to any of the parties, but most of his friends, including Guchkov and Rodzianko, belonged to the Octobrists. But he was not Bahmetev Octobrist. Nor was he a cadet. Later Bahmetev defined its views of that time as humanistic socialism. And he kept them until the beginning of 1950
. However, by that time, recalled Bakhmetev, he completely lost faith in socialism, nationalization, and indeed in any socialist economic theory. (18)
. March 9, 1917 Bahmetev was appointed Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Provisional Government to the Minister of AI Konovalov, leaving the post of professor of the Polytechnic Institute
. He was immediately assigned to two departments - one was associated with the commercial and technical education, the other - to the ports and merchant marine. Besides Bahmetev, as Secretary of State, in the case of substituted ingredients of the Minister for government meetings. Bahmetev was fascinated by his work. He was engaged to her long, just two months before his departure for America, but as he said later, I've never been so busy, I've never been so happy, I've never been so satisfied (19).
. The work of the position of Deputy Minister Bahmetev faced with either fishing regime in the region of Kamchatka, whether in the Yellow Sea, on the subject were large differences with Japan
. Bakhmetev interested in the general policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the issue, but none of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not give him a credible answer to the question interested him. In the end I had to go to the reception to the Minister - PN Miliukov.
Miliukov said Bakhmetev that surprised. This was the first time that someone came to him with a meaningful question. The Minister did not know the answer to the question of the mode of fishing, he advised Bakhmetev yet to find the responsible in the ministry and take a decision on my own. Miliukov said he is glad to acquaintance, especially because he had heard that his visitor was in America and it worked well.
Immediately Bahmetev received an unexpected offer - again go to America, now as an ambassador. The former ambassador, the namesake Bakhmetev Georgy, resigned. He was one of two ambassadors of the king's government, declared not to recognize the new regime and the resignation after the February Revolution. Russian Embassy in the U.S., according to Milyukova, crumbled into pieces. We need to send someone there. Will you charge? - In the forehead Miliukov asked the visitor.
Bahmetev initially protested, referring to his young age (36 years old at the time that was considered relatively young age for the ambassador) and inexperience. Miliukov insisted, stressing that in this case is not only a diplomatic mission. It is a government mission to organize military cooperation and the resolution of economic problems. Russia badly needed to obtain new loans. We have no one who knows America so well, - concluded the Minister.
Bahmetev initially did not want to go, as was his work, especially the transformation of economic legislation in Russia. But in the end he agreed to the proposal Milyukova. The factors that determined this decision were, firstly, that Bakhmetev offered a much more prestigious position than the position of Secretary of State, which he served.
. Second, . he recalled later, . my most important idea about America, . was then, . what could be called a dream or deep conviction, . that emerged at a time, . when I was there as part of the military mission, . working on behalf of the Central Military-Industrial Committee,
. It was a dream to work for the future of Russo-American friendship.
. I was absolutely convinced, based on my past contacts with the United States and based on general principles that the close ties between the United States and Russia have been a matter of great importance for both countries and it is a natural thing
. Both people - Russian and American - inhabit the continent, with vast expanses of relatively rare and represent tremendous opportunities for future development. Both countries have reached what might be called their natural boundaries. Because the oceans and seas have been achieved and not excluding the national - the imperialist policies - some of the kings, I was sure that people do not want any territorial expansion. All they wanted - there was peace and an opportunity to improve their welfare, to education, etc.
. Peace, in fact, was the supreme necessity for the Russian people and this is their national aspirations were parallel to the sincere desire for peace, which has always been characteristic of the American people.
. Another thing Bahmetev considered extremely important - to attract foreign capital and partly foreign technical skills to develop Russian natural resources
. If a European capital, French, Belgian and especially the Germanic and English, haunted, according to Bakhmetev, as a rule, along with economic, political objectives, then the U.S. capital was totally apolitical. Moreover, technical problems facing America were of the same nature as for Russia. For example, the construction of railways, the production of rolling stock, etc.. Compare, for example, spoke specifically thinking graduate of the Institute of Communications Bahmetev, the small British railway wagons with American, and you'll see the difference (20).
. Fluctuations Bakhmetev ended in something of a compromise - he led the mission, and after the completion of its work could go back
. He had been promised, in case of return, the same post. April 25, 1917 decree of the Provisional Government Bahmetev was appointed head of Russia's emergency mission to the United States, with the laying on him during the sojourn in the United States Mission Control Russia's embassy in Washington, and assigning at this time the title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (21).,
. Among the papers Bakhmetev at Columbia University kept his diplomatic passport
. With photos short hair and looks rather plump young-looking man in spectacles Bahmetev was dressed in a three, . with a bow tie, affixed in the passport and photograph of his wife, . dark-haired, . pince-nez, . in a dark dress, . strict teacher type, and she looked older than her husband.,
. The mission, comprising experts of different profiles, through Japan reached the U.S. and here she has done a trip from Seattle to Washington, having traveled almost across the country
. June 20 mission arrived in Washington by starting to implement its tasks. For Bakhmetev began his five-year diplomatic saga. Analyzing five years of mission activity, Bahmetev wrote: The mission came to America totally unprepared for the work which she was to. I am not mistaken, saying that no member of the mission, as well as anyone in Russia did not realize and did not have a clear idea of how the general world political thought and how to perform the world events. Diplomacy, politics, at best, pictured as a system of well-known skills and techniques inherent in the diplomatic office. Evaluation diplomatic talent and skill was to recognize a certain skill and dexterity in the manipulation of these routine methods (22).
. Bahmetev was totally inexperienced diplomat, but in this particular situation, diplomatic experience of the old school could hinder rather than help
. Its indisputable advantage was a good knowledge of America, the American political mores and customs. Bahmetev presented a striking contrast with his predecessor and namesake. The first thing that catches your eye in the activities of freshly baked diplomat - the publicity, the desire to influence American public opinion, the remarkable activity.
June 23 Bahmetev made a speech in the House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, and on June 26 - in the Senate. Both of his speech had a huge success. Perhaps because the congressmen and senators heard from Bakhmetev what they wanted to hear. Rightly writes Mark Raev, Bahmetev appeared before the congressmen and senators to publicly confirm the commitment of the Provisional Government to continue the war against the Central Powers (23). Were met with applause in the House of Representatives Bakhmetev statement that Russia would reject any idea of a separate peace, and that rumors about this, circulating in the United States, totally unfounded. Bahmetev also spoke about the new-born Russian democracy that the new government enjoys the full support and represents all the living elements of the country (24).
With great success was Bakhmetev speech in the Senate. The transcript noted that his pathetic speech constantly interrupted just applause, a standing ovation, loud applause. You bet! Bahmetev said unusually pleasant for the senatorial ears thing. He spoke about the commitment of the Russian people democracy, that people have rallied around a coalition government, strong on its democratic aspirations of people of strong faith in his ability to establish law and order. When I said - recalled Bahmetev - under any circumstances, my Government will not sign a separate peace, the whole House burst into applause. I have never seen a standing ovation for his entire life (25).
Are optimistic about Russia's participation in the war were also Bakhmetev newspaper interviews and his speech before enthusiastic crowds at rallies. As rightly D. Foglsong, . ignoring the news of the anti-war demonstrations in Petrograd, . Bahmetev told the correspondent of The New York Times, . that the war was one of the great things about the fundamental undeniable that in Russia there was no disagreement,
. Even after putting the Germans in Riga in September 1917 Bahmetev insisted that only 1 or 2 per cent of the army unreliable and claimed that the Russian army is broken and will not be crushed (26).
. Another favorite topic of speeches Bakhmetev a native democracy of the Russian people
. He saw it, in particular, in the peasant community, which is absolutely contrary to his previous social-democratic vision. Bahmetev the idea that the Slavs were prepared for the perception of American ideas and practices. Speaking in Boston, he said that Russia, the great democracy of the East, it will be hand in hand with her older sister, the great democracies of the West to bring the world the lofty ideals of humanism, freedom and justice (27).
. Bahmetev well aware of the mentality and characteristics of the political culture of America
. He has made unprecedented in the history of Russian diplomacy, propaganda tour of the country, from June to November, 1917. he played at least 26 times at various rallies, meetings, banquets. Bahmetev performed, except Washington and New York, which focused its political and economic interests, in Chicago, Boston, Saratoga, Atlantic City, Albany, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Memphis (28).
. Bakhmetev also managed to establish a trusting personal relationships with senior officials from the Department of State, . who were responsible for Russia's direction, . Frank Polk and Breckenridge Julius Long, . as well as a close associate of President Wilson and his advisor on foreign policy issues, Colonel Edward House,
. Bahmetev went to Colonel House in his name Magnolia in Massachusetts and made him a very favorable impression. House is particularly pleased that Bahmetev a sympathetic attitude to his plans for the future peace treaty and assured the colonel that the new Russia will be side by side with the United States to defend such a program. Another time, House noted in his diary that he and the Russian ambassador speak the same language. Had in mind hard liberal beliefs Bakhmetev.
The new ambassador presented a striking contrast in comparison with his predecessor and namesake. It was something barbaric - recalled his last meeting with the Ambassador of Imperial Russia, Georgy (Yury) Petrovich Bakhmetev Secretary of State Robert Lansing. - His cold-blooded cynicism and indifference to the appalling bloodshed among his countrymen on the battlefield and the hardships of ordinary people of the empire struck his heartlessness and cruelty. He belonged to the past century. Its modern appearance and manners were just the outer coating. His devotion to the king and royal personages of the medieval blood was. For him, the king was Russia. He did not recognize any other state, to which he was to remain faithful.
Not surprisingly, Lansing is not particularly listening to the gloomy forecasts GP. Bakhmetev, which he did at their last meeting April 11, 1917. Ambassador predicted that the Interim Government will not survive long and that the radical socialists (in the terminology of Lansing; Bahmetev used the word anarchists) would prevail and will conclude a separate peace with Germany. Unfortunately - a melancholy noted Lansing retroactively - a view of Ambassador was confirmed by subsequent events. However, during our conversation, I did not give his predictions of special significance, because he was a staunch monarchist, totally loyal to his emperor (29).
Initially, Bakhmetev 2-nd formed with state. Secretary Lansing is much more cool relations than with the House. Democratic rhetoric and optimism after contrary to some reports and analysis which Lansing has received from Russia through other channels. Anti-war propaganda, is actively pursued by the Bolsheviks in Russia and to meet the growing support among soldiers and workers, and the apparent inability of the Provisional Government to cope with the activities of extremists - all these factors did not inspire state. Secretary of confidence in the continuation of Russia's participation in the war. In it also was impressed by letters from Russia such a renowned expert, as George Kennan, in which he sharply criticized the policies of the Provisional Government and called attention to the dangerous activities of the Soviets. Lansing doubted the ability of Kerensky to cope with the radicals and protect society from lawlessness (30).
. Given the events, . unfolded in Russia since June 1917, . are difficult to characterize different, . than a permanent political and economic crisis, . ending the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October and the country's withdrawal from the war four months later, . assurances Bakhmetev seem in retrospect something bordering on deception,
. Some well represented (of course, in a thoroughly consistent academic style) activities in the book Bakhmetev D. Foglsonga. I believe, however, that it was not just in the understandable desire Bakhmetev get the financial support to the fighting in Russia, which made it necessary to represent the course of events in Russia in a more favorable light than it really was.
. By the way, by November, 1917
. U.S. government agreed to provide Russia with a total of 325 million dollars (31) in the form of loans and credits, but transferred to the accounts of the Provisional Government was only 187,729,750 dollars, ie. slightly more than half of the promised. This was much less than that asked for Russian officials and a very small amount compared to the assistance that was provided by Britain and France.
. Bahmetev really believed in the new democratic Russia and its ability to defend their newly found freedom with arms
. To do this, need help - he wanted her. What Bahmetev really believed in this new Russia, shows his personal correspondence, especially with Maklakov. We must also bear in mind the specific experience Bakhmetev. Growing up in the family of the entrepreneur, the man who made himself, in an atmosphere permeated by the spirit of pioneers, he and then rotated among the young, energetic entrepreneurs, politicians, people in his eyes, build a new Russia. In one letter, Maklakov he compared Russia 1903 and 1913. Dramatic changes have occurred, there was rapid economic growth. Even more striking were the changes in the political field: on the one hand, . police regime Plehve, . on the other - the State Duma, . approving the budget of the country, . with the Social Democratic faction, . it in session, . actually little limited freedom of speech, etc.,
. After the February Revolution Bahmetev also worked on specific and very interesting business, he saw the practical positive results of the revolution, . at least in terms of legislation, to the part, . which concerned the economy, . regulate business, . he himself had a hand,
. He left Russia, . when honeymoons freedom has not ended, perhaps, . it left an imprint on his assessment of the situation in the country at a later period, . when the motion on an inclined plane has taken an increasingly rapid and irreversible.,
. It should probably also take into account the philosophy of history svoebraznuyu Bakhmetev
. Much later, speaking in connection with his story U. Links on the February Revolution of regularity and chance in history, Bahmetev led a conversation about this with the famous historian of antiquity MI Rostovtsev. Rostovtsev said based on his 50-year experience of studying history, that there is nothing inevitable that the majority of events - completely random. Of course, there are underlying forces - political, economic, social, national, which determine the movement in one direction or another, they appear for 20, 30, 50 and more years. But what happens from day to day - quite by accident (32).
Thus, much of the history depends on the activities of a specific person in specific circumstances. Nothing is predetermined. And the former Social Democrat, has sought to do everything possible that was in his power to a new (real or imagined) of a democratic Russia.
. Must take into account another factor - in the new democratic Russia and the strength of the Provisional Government came to believe not only Bahmetev
. The mission of Senator Ruth E., . directed by the U.S. government in Russia (33), . to understand the situation on the ground, . concluded, . similar to the assurances Ambassador: The whole mission was filled with the spirit of optimism, . confidence in the Provisional Government, . determination and belief in Russia's ability to vigorously prosecute the war against the Central Powers,
. Upon returning to America, they hastened to assure the country's loyalty to allies and Russia in the bright future of Russian democracy. August 8, the mission was called to the White House and reported its findings to President Wilson. Optimism was unanimous, but stressed the need for U.S. aid (34).
. Views that developing liberal-democratic leadership of the Provisional Government on the importance of the Russian revolution and the war aims in full harmony with the views of American liberals - wrote F. Schumann
. - A new impetus was given to the old tradition of Russo-American friendship, Russia started on the path of political development, which has long followed the United States. From America's very much like the Council, encouragement and assistance. The Provisional Government was faced with difficulties, . but implied, . strongly supported by the masses, . successfully cope with the dual challenge of war and the convening of a Constituent Assembly in order, . to lay a solid foundation for the future of the Russian state,
. Such were the views of ministers of this government, constitutional democracy, many moderate socialists, liberal intellectuals and their representatives abroad. Such were the views of President Wilson, Mr. Ruta, Ambassador Francis and the vast majority of American legislators, publishers and public figures in general. And adhere to these representations was the most pleasant.
Perspectives that they discovered, had been encouraging, reassuring and at the same time desirable. They are relevant to the pre-formed concepts and political and social prejudices of those who adhered. What they did not meet the actual situation in Russia, was insufficient reason to abandon them. They are firmly entrenched in the minds of Americans for many years, with consequences just as tragic as it is absurd were these representations (35).
. Hindsight Bahmetev said: Is it possible to continue the war was a fatal mistake, but I believe it was correct - hold on and try to be loyal to the Allied cause
. Reflecting on the causes of the collapse of the Provisional Government, 33 years later, he spoke of the weariness of the war, that by signing the Provisional Government of the world, it retained power. However, it has chosen to honor. On the first day of its existence, the Foreign Minister assured the ambassadors of the allies that Russia will continue to fight. This was, of course, for their great relief, but probably the death knell (death knell) for the Provisional Government. However, in 1917, the ambassador reasoned quite differently.
One way or another, but with the Bolshevik coup period of mutual admiration, however, marred occasionally alarming reports from Petrograd, ended. The period from November 1917. until the armistice between the Allies and Central Powers was represented by Ambassador to the most difficult and most painful period of. A few days after arrival from Memphis, where Bakhmetev will make the news of the change of power in Petrograd, it is directed state. Secretary of the note, which dramatically and irrevocably severed our representation of the Bolshevik regime, and immediately declared that we consider it our duty, as circumstances permit, to remain in office to defend the national interests of Russia.
. Everyone at first thought that the Bolsheviks - a short episode
. Bahmetev gave that power a little longer, measuring its presence for months, however, and it seemed that the Bolsheviks did not survive until spring. Arguing in his new analytical note on the reasons for coming to power of the Bolsheviks, . Bahmetev, . particularly, . wrote: I also was clearly improper influence foreign policy as allies, . and from the Provisional Government, . policy, . which in no way, . seemed, . not considered by the spontaneous will of the country, . directed toward the exit from the war,
. Now evaluating the experiences of ten years, I think that I overestimated while the possibility of a positive influence on the mood of the masses of reasonable foreign policy. Anyway, for me it was quite clear that in the interests of Russia and in the light of a fair and reasonable policy of the Allies should have immediately separated the Bolshevik government from the people.
. Ideas Bakhmetev were perceived (or coincide) with the feelings of the leaders of the American administration
. The most important thing that they corresponded to the head of administration - President Wilson. Both the president and the ambassador, writes D. Foglsong, saw in the Bolshevik Revolution a temporary setback that will be overcome. Both clearly separated regime came to power in Petrograd and the real Russian people. Wilson wrote on Nov. 13, 1917 one of the congressmen, . have not lost faith in the rebirth of Russia: Russia, . like France in the last century, . undoubtedly goes deep water and climbs on solid ground on the other side and its great people,
. it will take a worthy place in the world.
Not all administration associated with Russian affairs, shared the optimism of the president, but his opinion was a decisive. Moreover, . no matter how treated Bakhmetev and its unusual status after a non-existent government or that the Administration, . they shared one thing - hatred of Bolshevism, . will be aggravated by the Soviet government after the conclusion of peace with Germany.,
. Thus Bahmetev retained its status, Washington considered him a real representative of the Russian people
. More significant was the fact that Bakhmetev, albeit under the supervision and with the permission of the Ministry of Finance, received the right to dispose of funds in the accounts of the Provisional Government in U.S. banks. Transfer of funds on account of loans in the Provisional Government ceased. However, the money, . have already been transferred, . not frozen, . and used after the Russian debt to service, . payments already concluded under the guarantee of U.S. government contracts, etc. these funds largely went to finance the anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia,
. The embassy was a convenient conduit for the transfer of funds to Russia, it is through the Embassy funded the activities of the American mission to maintain the Trans-Siberian Railway. Total estimated Foglsonga, through the embassy was held procurement funding for the needs of the White armies in excess of 50 million. U.S.. Using Russia's embassy as a conduit to aid anti-Bolshevik movements allowed the Wilson administration to avoid requests for funding for these purposes by the Congress and contributed to, . that this assistance has remained hidden from the press and the American people, . - Writes the American historian.,
. Not surprisingly, Bahmetev became one of the most influential figures among the Russian diplomatic representatives abroad
Another key figure in the diplomatic, financial and material support of the anti-Bolshevik movement was ambassador in Paris Maklakov. Since the early days of his stay in Paris he had to take a leadership role in organizing the anti-Bolshevik movement. On 27 October he sent telegrams to Russia's ambassador in London (KN Nabokov), Rome (MN Girsu) and Washington with a proposal to adopt a unified position and, of course, not to recognize the Bolshevik government. Maklakov met with the full support of their colleagues, including Bakhmetev.
. Ambassadors had to defend the national interests of Russia in the post-war reconstruction of the world, . when power and revenge often prevailed over justice and common sense, with the ambassadors could not rely on any legitimate Government of Russia, none of the anti-Bolshevik government was not strong enough and durable, . to merit an official international recognition, but that the government, . sitting in Moscow, . after, . opposite, . endeavored, . avoid even talks with him.,
. After coming to restrain the ambitions of the White generals and serve as a kind of intermediary between the various political forces of the anti-Bolshevik camp, and often their work was directed not so much to represent the interests of the Russian government abroad, . much effect on their domestic policies - against Restoration, . monarchism, . inability to accommodate the interests of various nations, . inhabiting the former empire Rossiyskuyu,
. After the defeat of white on the shoulders of the ambassadors went to the care of hundreds of thousands of Russian refugees.
November 22 (5 December) 1917. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet government Trotsky Russia sent after a request to submit the new government and to follow his instructions or to resign immediately, Trotsky warned, . that refusal to comply with its requirement to be considered as a heinous crime against the state,
. All the ambassadors, by mutual agreement, with the exception of Russia's representative in Portugal P.L.Ungern-Sternberg, did not respond to the telegram of Trotsky, thus refusing to recognize the new government. November 26 (9 December) was an order of Trotsky's dismissal of ambassadors and envoys, did not respond to a telegram to the proposal to work under the leadership of the Soviet power, with no pension rights and income for any public office.
. In late November, 1917
. Paris was a coordinating body, the meeting of ambassadors, which included MN Girs (Italy), KD Nabokov (England), MA Stakhovich (Spain), I. Efremov (Switzerland) and Maklakova. Formally, all Russia's ambassadors were listed members of the meeting, but in fact, apart from those mentioned, active participation in its work has only Bahmetev. The meeting was to meet from time to time, to discuss current policies and develop a common position, with all decisions had to be unanimous, was elected Chairman Maklakov.
. Objectives, . have set themselves diplomats, . reduced to four main issues: preventing the recognition of the allies of the Soviet authorities, providing moral and material support of white troops, defending the territorial integrity of Russia and defending its traditional national interests, the Western powers recognized as legitimate representatives of the anti-Bolshevik government of Russia.,
. Very soon Russia's ambassadors were convinced that the hope of an early collapse of the Soviet Government are baseless and without foreign support up to direct military intervention, the Bolsheviks would be difficult to overcome
. In fact such support may in some degree to England, France, USA and Japan. However, there were contradictions between them, sometimes serious, as between the U.S. and Japan in the Far East, but even more contradictions exist between the various forces of the anti-Bolshevik camp, both inside and especially outside Russia.
. Maklakov Bahmetev and were willing, . especially after the signing of the Bolshevik Brest-Litovsk peace, . the need for early intervention of foreign, . but the ambassador in Washington considered it desirable to support his name being abroad, Russian, . as well as the names of famous Russian politicians, democratically oriented, . example, . B. Savinkov and IG Tsereteli, . Why even write them specially from Russia,
. Maklakov believed that we can not linger, knowing better than its correspondent customs of Russia's political elite, he feared that major decisions will drown in a dispute over trifles.
. Every possible way sympathizing with your thoughts moral support to outside interference and for the combined Russian forces abroad, . - Telegraphed Maklakov Bakhmetev at the end of April 1918, . - I think, . that this will give impetus to national revival in Russia, the emergence of military force, . which came to her defense,
. . With horror I see that Wilson is too slow to understand what to do and an excess of correctness is ruining Russia.
. For bleeding France can not count, besides Russia after concluding a separate peace, she experienced a paroxysm of Russophobia
. Equally low was hope for England, which was not up to Russia at a time when the battle on the Western Front entered a decisive phase. Ministers, . Members of the War Cabinet, and himself the head of the Cabinet, . with increasing thrilled, . twice a day, . Bulletin of the military from the Western Front - could they guess on the day coming, . look far ahead and then understand, . - Wrote about the situation March-August 1918 Russia's ambassador to Britain KD Nabokov, . - That the abandonment of Russia's Bolshevik tyranny they,
. risk of paralyzing effects of even the most complete victory? No, could not. They fended off Russia, from the question of aid to Russia. .
Regarding Japan, Russia and its intentions diplomats had serious doubts. The most capacious they managed to formulate the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Bertie, who recorded in his diary for March 12, 1918: The so-called Russian ambassador Maklakov wants and does not want the Japanese intervention in Siberia. This was also the position Bakhmetev; his concerns about the sincerity of the Japanese and the extent of their presence in Russia, correlated with a suspicious attitude towards the activity of Japan in the Far East by the U.S. administration.
. From April to July 1918
. Russia's embassy in Washington has undertaken a campaign to persuade President Wilson and the American people to endorse the American intervention in Russia. Embassy employees were sent to the promotional lecture tour, in the campaign including prominent Russian politicians, went abroad, but public speaking, individual work was carried out with officials at the State Department.
. Non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, at least in words, was a fundamental principle of diplomacy Wilson
. Therefore, . Even before the president's decision to send American troops to Russia on condition that, . that they will be part of the Allied forces, . Bakhmetev met with one of the assistant secretary of state, . B. Julius Long, . which it was agreed, . American troops would not act in the interests of any political group, . but will only support the motion, . which will take the national character and will represent the interests of Russia as a whole.,
. This meant that the Bolsheviks declared a national force will not under any circumstances
. The condition for the recognition of a group or movement, expressing the real interests of the all-Russian, was the recognition of the principles of democracy, free enterprise and the intention to continue the war with Germany and its allies. Throughout the Civil War, Russian diplomats have sought recognition of the allies of any of the anti-Bolshevik government, acting on the territory of Russia. Success is not crowned, except for recognition of the Government Wrangell France de facto in August 1920, when it already had almost symbolic significance.
. As far as advice and opinions Bakhmetev taken into account the United States Administration in the formation of its Russia policy? The views of historians on this matter diverge
. Among those who felt the influence Bakhmetev serious - George Kennan, Robert Maddox, Linda Killen, and in particular David Foglsong. L. Killen wrote that Bahmetev did Russian policy of America. He tried, and with some success, to influence the formulation of this policy. Thesis Killen felt a tension. Is not the formulation of policies in a certain sense it doing? In our opinion, more accurate R.Sh. Ganelin, who writes that the idea Bakhmetev have had some influence on the post-October Washington's policy on the Russian question. They became the starting point of one of the lines of American politics, appearing quite an important episode in the prehistory. Wilson 14 points.
Is especially clearly seen in the history of the 6 th paragraph of the famous 14-President Wilson on Russia. The conclusion of an armistice with Germany, the Bolsheviks and their call for the immediate signing of peace without annexations and indemnities served as motivation for Wilson's speech, in relation to Russia, . further intentions of the new leadership which were not evident, . it was necessary to observe the sensitivity, . not to push it into the arms of Germany and, . At the same time, . demonstrate the friendship of America to Russia,
. Bakhmetev, which could not be suspected of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks, advised to refrain from a formal protest against the policies of Lenin or of any threats which will only strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks.
. The telegram, which the ambassador gave Nov. 30, 1917 Colonel House, made a strong impression at last
. Although the government of Lenin, . - Telegraphed Bahmetev, . - To take power through violence, . can not be regarded as government, . representing the will of the Russian nation, . his call, . appeal to the allies and calling for a truce, . can not be left unanswered, . since any deviation from the allies to address the issue of the world will only strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks, and help them to create an atmosphere in Russia, . hostile allies,
. There is no formal protest against the policies of Lenin or any threat would have the same effect. They would only worsen the situation and help you reach a perfectionist to the extreme. .
House consulted Bakhmetev before his departure to Washington and written by Wilson in its essence and content close to the outline of the Ambassador. I read to him (the president - OB) prepared me a proposal - recorded House - referring to Russia and preliminary evaluation of the Russian ambassador, it is approved it. I said, . that indifferent, . how great is the indignation over the president act Russian: Reason tells us to isolate Russia, . as possible, . from Germany, . and this can be achieved only in an open and friendly expression of sympathy and the promise of more assistance,
. The President did not mind because our thoughts were quite similar, and what he wrote about Russia is, in my opinion, in some respects the most eloquent part of his message.
. Paragraph 6 states: Purification of the entire occupied Russian territory, and resolve issues, . affecting Russia, . promotes the best and freest cooperation of other nations of the world, . to help Russia to use freely and without difficulties, opportunities for independent resolution of questions of her own political development and national policy and to guarantee her sincere, . cordial welcome to the community of free nations subject to the determination of its form of government of their choice,
. And not only admission to the union of nations, as well as the assistance of any kind, in which it may need and which she likes.
All this politeness was wasted. Lenin wanted a completely different than President Wilson. And Germany is not going to let go the long-awaited production. Thus Bahmetev, at least from time to time, involved not only in the formulation, but also in shaping American policy toward Russia. Two important text in which the declared principles of this policy have been prepared for his participation - except 6-th item, the ambassador, later, put his hand to note Secretary of State B. Colby.
. More highly than Killen, though generally negative, evaluates the impact of the Russian ambassador Foglsong
. He writes that despite the loss of President Wilson and his advisers confidence in the Provisional Government, because they committed blunders and incompetence, State Department officials have maintained their appreciation for the Ambassador Bakhmetev. After the Bolshevik revolution, the general anti-Bolshevism cemented the relationship between Lansing and Bakhmetev. Secretary of State is often referred to the views Bakhmetev, especially in countering the fragmentation of Russia in the individual states. In his memoirs, Lansing bright colors depicts how Bahmetev behaved and affairs of the embassy with tact and restraint, so that when he left his post. he retained the respect and goodwill of many friends, acquired them during his ambassadorial career. It is also highly valued Bakhmetev Deputy Lansing, Frank Polk, who considered after an extremely useful representative of Russia.
. Quite a different position evaluates activities Bakhmetev and its partners in the administration of President Wilson's modern researcher
. Russia's Embassy - wrote Foglsong - played a crucial dual role in the secret war against Bolshevism Administration. Embassy served as a public symbol of the real Russia, which, as Wilson had hoped the administration, will emerge from the chaos of civil war. At the same time, the embassy served as a secret conduit for the supply of anti-Bolshevik forces that the administration could not carry openly and directly, as feared opposition in the society and critics in Congress. Bahmetevskie tact and restraint, lifted Lansing, helped Washington keep the faith in Russia, while the covert support of anti-Bolshevik movements led to the erosion of faith in democratic procedures in America.
. If you try to look at the situation through the eyes of the then-Bakhmetev, . and his memories and in particular correspondence 1917-1930-ies can do, . then all his activities as ambassador was aimed at, . to give the Russian people to express their will and realize the inherent aspirations; Bahmetev was convinced, . that these include freedom, . democracy, . ownership,
. He considered it necessary to preserve the integrity of the state, created by centuries. Foreign aid, because of the circumstances, seemed to him a necessary condition for the impasse in which the country finds itself. Appealing to the numerous speeches, articles, interviews, memoranda to the American public opinion or to particular administration officials to support a democratic Russia, Bahmetev not lying. He really believed in this democratic Russia, part of which feel myself. Another question is whether there was in fact Russia. I believe that, apart from logic, inner conviction Ambassador has an impact on American politicians, not deprived, as he fairly share of idealism.
. Perhaps the most critical moment for Russia's diplomacy came after the end of hostilities and the conclusion of the armistice
. At the Paris conference were to decide the fate of the world. It was necessary to represent the interests of Russia, the condition of Russian diplomats was extremely ambiguous, would relegate the brunt of the gravity of the first three years of war and suffered great losses, . Russia, . after coming to power of the Bolsheviks, . concluded a separate peace and withdrew from the war,
. Can be plenty to talk about what the Bolsheviks did not reflect the true sentiments of the people who wanted to fight on, but the fact was evident.
. None of the anti-Bolshevik government was not sufficiently strong and durable, to be recognized as government allies to the same Kolchak and Denikin were still unable to agree among themselves
. Provisional Government, which were once ambassadors, no longer existed. To somehow get out of this ambiguous situation, Bahmetev proposed a substitute for national representation of the diplomats, adding a few of the representatives of the newly formed government in Russia. He correctly foresaw the difficulties in ensuring the authority of casting vote at the conference. Bahmetev insisted on accelerating the process of formation of representation in view of the expected arrival in early December by President Wilson in Paris, . Again, believing, . that much will be decided at the preliminary meetings before the official opening of the conference,
. He suggested as a possible leader of the delegation, General MV Alekseev, and Prince. GE Lvov. These two names, representing the national symbol of Russia, would be organized around a Russian representative.
. Maklakov, . doubted, . that any substitute for legal representation could provide Russia's equal participation in the congress (and the objections he had expected not only from the powers, . but later, and Russia itself), . nevertheless felt it necessary to create a surrogate, . primarily to protect the interests of Russia in the preliminaries of the conference stage,
. In the final analysis the fate of Russia will depend solely on the success of its reconstruction, which is slow. The issue of representation Maklakov considered so important and difficult, that insisted on coming Bakhmetev in Paris, besides, he hoped that the Ambassador in Washington will be able to get the money for the work of Mission. Maklakov, after meeting with arrived in Paris Gershom and Nabokov, telegraphed Bakhmetev that they support his plan, but with some modifications:. There will not be generally accepted government for the semi-official representatives of Russia, . to create a panel, . which, . except diplomatic representatives, . would consist of prominent and authoritative representatives of all main lines and shades of political thought,
. We consider it necessary to be fully representative, to ensure that this opinion does not seem to party and could not be disputed by prominent political currents. unanimous opinion of this board seems to us the most respected in Russia as well as for Congress. This nasche differences of opinion with you, we do not have a universally recognized national leader. Alekseev died, and kn.Lvov alone is insufficient. Required front, not a person.
As a result of difficult negotiations, was formed a sort of all-Russia representative, called the Russian political meeting. The first mention of it relates to December 1918. Its members eventually joined the Ambassadors Maklakov, . Girs, . Bahmetev, . KN Gulkevich, . Efremov, . Stahovich, . and former tsarist ministers of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, . recognized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kolchak and Denikin, . and AP Isvolsky, . former Minister of the Provisional Government Konovalov, . representatives of democracy - the head of the Archangel government, . last famous revolutionary populist NV Tchaikovsky, . SA Ivanov, . member of the Kuban Government NS Dolgopolov, . terrorist BV Savinkov,
. Was elected Chairman, Prince Lvov, former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government. He was the representative of Omsk, and besides, because of its short-and hapless prime minister, was the most senior figure in the recent past among Russian politicians abroad.
. Later from the meeting was allocated more compact Russian political delegation, . responsible in the case of the opportunity of representing the interests of Russia at the peace conference, the delegation included kn.Lvov (Chairman), . Sazonov, . Maklakov, . Tchaikovsky, in August 1919,
. added Savinkov. At the meeting served a number of commissions; Bahmetev spearheaded the Political Commission, focusing on the preparation of documents on the territorial settlement, especially on the status of Bessarabia and Finland.
. Proceedings of the Meeting, as well as experts serving his needs, has been funded, with the consent of the U.S. State Department, with funds in the accounts of the Provisional Government
. Bakhmetev was allotted 100 thousand. U.S.. Later, the necessary funds have come from Omsk, in the hands of Kolchak government was a big part of Russia's gold reserves. Bahmetev arrived in Paris in December 1918, becoming one of the key figures of the meeting, the ambassador returned to the United States in July 1919. During the joint work, of course, and there was a personal rapprochement Bakhmetev and Maklakova
. Among the most important tasks, . posed a Russian political meeting, . were preserving the territorial integrity of Russia, . It also sought to achieve, . that any decision of the conference, . affecting the interests of Russia, . was delayed until consultations with the Russian government recognized and finally, . Meeting sought from allies clear statements, . condemning Bolshevism and proclaim support for the liberal forces in Russia,
. Bahmetev informed about all the wishes of the American delegation.
. Russian political meeting, despite the exercise of its members activity and persistence, most of its objectives, except for a statement of Britain, France, the United States and Italy on 26 May 1919
. the willingness to acknowledge Kolchak is subject to its democratic elections and respect for the rights of nationalities (recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland, . Autonomy, . pending the final decision on their status, . Lithuania, . Latvia and Estonia, . as well as the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspian formations), . confirmed June 12, . after receiving positive, . Although evasive on the question of the national response Kolchak, . not reached,
. Yes, and could not reach, because still hung in the air. I must admit that in the situation faced by people claiming to speak on behalf of Russia, they have done everything possible.
Bakhmetev many considered an opponent of white movement. This was subsequently reflected even in one of