Buchanan (Buchanan), James M.( American economist, Nobel Memorial Award in Economics, 1986)
Comments for Buchanan (Buchanan), James M.
Biography Buchanan (Buchanan), James M.
genus. October 2, 1919
American economist James McGill Buchanan was born in g. Merarisboro (Tennessee). His father, James, in whose honor B. was named, was a farmer and his mother. Lila (nee Scott) Buchanan, before her marriage was a school teacher, parents B. actively involved in local politics. Father B. John P. Buchanan served for one term governor of Tennessee, he was promoted to the position of the Farmers Union populist party. Parents urged B. repeat the path traversed by his grandfather. However, the Great Depression disrupted plans B. studied law at Vanderbilt University. Instead, he went to study at Teachers College of Middle Tennessee in Murfreesboro, cashing in on the training and the purchase of books milking cows.
. After college the best pupil in the group with a specialization in mathematics, English literature and social sciences, B
. was awarded a scholarship to continue his education at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Tennessee, where he graduated in 1941. MA degree. In August of that year, B. was called up for military service and received training at the rank of a naval officer in New York, and then for some time studied at the Naval War College. After the U.S. entry into World War II he was assigned to the operational headquarters of Admiral Chester U. Nimitz, who at that time commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During the war, B. served in the headquarters of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and then to Guam.
After the war, B. continued his education at the University of Chicago, which fell under the influence of Frank X. Knight - one of the professors of economics. Despite the fact that B. came to Chicago in his own words, 'a socialist liberal wing', he later took back his words: 'Within six weeks after the visit of the course, Frank Knight, on the theory of prices, I became an ardent advocate of market economy'. Another major influence on subsequent work of B. thesis Knuth has Viksellya tax in 1896, which he accidentally discovered on the library shelf, and then translated from German into English. Swedish economist Viksell considered politics as a process of complex, mutually beneficial exchange between citizens and structures that they create for the organization of society. Viksell also argued that the reform of economic policy requires a change in the rules under which political leaders operate. Concept Knight and Viksellya have important effects on the development of B. theories of public choice and constitutional economics.
In 1948, after receiving the University of Chicago doctoral degree in Economics, B. entered the post of Adjunct Professor at the University of Tennessee, and from 1950 g. became a full (real) professor at the same university. The following year he moved to the University of Florida, and there in 1954. appointed dean of the Faculty of Economics. Thanks to a Fulbright scholarship B. conducted a training 1955/56 r. in Rome and Perugia, studying the classic works of Italian economists in the theory of public finance and develop their own ideas of relations between political structures and economic policies.
Returning to the U.S., B. was promoted to professor and dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Virginia in g. Charlottesville. In 1957. with the American economist, J. Warren Nutter, he founded the Center for Research in the field of political economy. Thomas Jefferson. According to BA, they sought to establish a 'community of scholars, who dreamed maintain social order, based on individual freedom' and 'to prevent the growth of technical specialization in the economy'. B. served as director of the Center from 1957 to 1969. In 1963, Mr.. B. and Gordon Tullock, held at the Center Postdoctoral training soon after its foundation, created the Committee for the adoption of non-market solutions, the predecessor Center for the Study of Public Choice.
After graduation 1968/69, when B. worked as a visiting professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, he moved to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg as a leading professor. There he was joined by Tullock, with whom he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice, whose Director General became B. The new center was established with a view to the application of economic methods and ways of thinking to the study of political processes. When in 1983. B. was appointed professor at George Mason University, the location of the Center was moved to the campus, Mr.. Fairfax (Virginia).
As a result of research conducted over the past 40 years, B. received international recognition as a leading researcher in the field, which is called public choice theory and explores the application of economic techniques to the areas traditionally been the political science. The main categories of analysis are not as organic unity as a nation, state or party, and the individual (private) persons capable of making rational decisions, leading to the advantage of society as a whole. Public choice theory seeks to predict, . as the behavior of individuals in their political roles of voters or taxpayers, . lobbyists or candidates for political leaders, . elected politicians or members of political parties, . bureaucrats or government managers and judges can affect the state of the political community as a whole,
. Economic theory is, . opposite, . trying to link the behavior of individuals in their economic role of buyers or sellers, . producers or workers, . investors and entrepreneurs with the results, . manifested at the level of the economy as a whole.,
. Studying the political exchange, B
. identifies two conceptually different levels of public choice - the initial constitutional level of choice (before the adoption of the Constitution) and postkonstitutsionny level. Investigation of the first level involves the development of economic theory of the Constitution, while the second is developing economic theory of political institutions. The difference between the two levels of choice may be identified as an analogy for choices that people make during the game. First, selected rules of the game, then going on to define a strategy game under these rules. In general, the constitution can be represented as a set of rules for the conduct of the political game. Daily political actions are the result of the game in the framework of constitutional rules.
B. As shown, the use of this analogy can lead to an understanding of a number of major processes. Just as the rules of the game form its likely outcome, the constitutional rules shape policy outcomes or impede their achievement. Thus, improvements in policy outcomes or the results of the process of adopting legislative or managerial decisions require changes or amendments of the Constitution. The basis of search for better rules of any game is an analysis of the probable direction of what will play with different rules. Similarly, the approach to reform of the constitution must be determined by analysis of the likely positive predictability of alternative policies and processes.
. The difference between constitutional and postkonstitutsionnym choice was first presented in the monograph 'The calculus of consent' ( "The Calculus of Consent", 1962), written B
. together with Gordon Tullock. Developing Viksellya view politics as a complex process of mutual exchange, B. and Tullock questioned, . how these exchanges can be organized in such a way, . that all participants can expect to receive a net positive result at the level of constitutional choice, . in particular, what political rules and procedures should guide the choice of collective or governmental politikiN,
. They considered this issue from the standpoint of individual members of society, . facing the choice of alternative decision rules and procedures, . given, . later that these individual members of society will be forced to make decisions under these rules and procedures,
. Studied a variety of decision rules and procedures, . including, . inter alia, . rule of unanimity, . rule of qualified majority, . simple majority rule, . rule of mutual services, . database representation, . bicameral and unicameral legislature,
. B. explored various applications of these rules in the works 'Public Finance and the democratic process' ( "Public Finance in Democratic Process", 1967), 'Demand and supply of public goods' ( "Demand and Supply of Public Goods", 1968).
. In this paper, 'The limits of liberty: between anarchy and Leviathan' ( "The Limits to Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan", 1975) B
. drew a distinction between the protective and productive state government. From his point of view, the constitutional treaty (or set of rules and procedures, in which there is a political organization) leads to the establishment of a protective state. This ordain structure determines ownership and control of individuals over resources, stimulates private contracts and limits the power of the state. The emergence of a protective state is a leap from anarchy to a political organization. As part of the organizational structure of organized trade and the exchange of privately produced goods and services can contribute to the mutual benefit of participants in this process.
. In terms of BA, ideally productive state stimulates postkonstitutsionny contract between citizens with regard to their demand for the jointly consumed goods and services
. However, the behavior of individuals prescribed to them by their activities in the political structure, as politicians, managers and bureaucrats, enhances the state in postkonstitutsionnoy stage. This makes the threat of Leviathan - a famous political character of Thomas Hobbes, which he designated the autocratic state. For B. solution is to use the modern theory of politics, administration and bureaucracy for the institutions and rules that would limit spontaneously and specially interested political behavior.
. In his later works B
. reviewed and developed further the need for constitutional reform. In this paper, 'Democracy in deficit' ( "Democracy in Deficit, 1977), written jointly with Richard E. Wagner, . constitutional requirement of a balanced budget is justified by an analysis of model behavior postkonstitutsionnogo, . where the fiscal deficit helps politicians to gain political support from a large number of political segments by increasing public expenditures for specific purposes, . while restraining the growth of taxes, . which would cover these costs,
. In this paper, 'The power to tax' ( "The Power to Tax", . 1980), . written jointly with Geoffrey Brennan, . constitutional limitations on the powers of government in the field of taxation justified, . based on the model postkonstitutsionnoy policy, . in which the government seen as a body, . seeks to maximize profits,
. B. supported directly and indirectly, the various proposals of constitutional amendments requiring a balanced federal budget.
B. was awarded the Nobel Memorial Award in Economics for 1986. 'for the study of contractual and constitutional foundations of the theory of making environmental and political decision-making'. According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences' main achievement B. lies in the fact that he constantly and consistently emphasized the importance of the fundamental rules and applied the concept of the political system as an exchange process with a view dstizheniya mutual benefit '.
In 1945, Mr.. B. married Anna Bakke, whom he met during the war. Buchanan, who have no children, live in her home in Fairfax, and on his farm in southwestern Virginia. B. retained throughout his life interest in the study of languages and translated many important economic activities in the German and Italian languages.
In addition to the Nobel Prize, B. was marked by many other awards and distinctions, including honorary award in the field of political economy, Frank E. Seidman University of Tennessee (1984) and an honorary degree from Zurich (Switzerland) and Hesse (Germany) Universities. He is an honorary member of the American Economic Association and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as president of the Southern Economic Association (1963) and vice-president of the American Economic Association (1971), . Vice-President (1981 ... 1982) and president (1983 ... 1984) Western Economic Association, . Vice-President (1982 ... 1984) and president (1984 ... 1986) Company Lederinovyh mountains.,